2016-12-30T09:07:00-08:00
Misr will not return except through the gate of Yemen, the equation that Misr has not yet comprehended. Almost five months before Saudi Arabia announced the establishment of the Decisive Storm coalition comprising 13 countries and launching an aggression against Yemen, an Egyptian media delegation was visiting Yemen to see the new developments taking place in Yemen, especially after Fears escalated about the Houthis’ control of the coastal strip and security in Bab al-Mandab. The delegation held a press interview with former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. In the meeting, Saleh revealed the correct equation of Misr’s power and presented it as a gift to Misr, saying verbatim: The crisis in Yemen is resolved in Misr’s hands. We present the Yemen file to Misr, and we are satisfied with its solutions to the crisis, but on the condition that Misr is Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Misr. Many are aware of the reality of the massive, systematic and deliberate intellectual and media distortion of the era of Abdel Nasser after Sadat’s rise to power, especially inside Misr. These distortions were not aimed at Nasser himself in a personal matter, but rather they were basically targeting all Egyptian politics, positions and steps in that era. era and criminalizing it in the consciousness of public opinion, except inside or outside Misr, and considering it as wrong and destructive policies for Misr. Rather, its goal was to separate Misr intellectually and psychologically from its surroundings, considering that the surroundings have no connection or relationship with Misr, but rather harm it and are the cause of Misr’s setbacks. Its losses, and we know how waves of discontent appeared from the ocean, and increased after the ocean boycotted Misr after the Camp Dawoud Accords, and for this reason a hero of victory was created for Misr, a symbol of victory in order to overthrow the symbolism of Nasser, for this symbol was able to achieve victory and is capable of pulling the rug from Nasser. And criminalize him and then take any step that will be blessed by all the people. He is the only one capable of extending his hand to Israel, given that this hero was victorious, and he extends his hand out of strength, not weakness. This policy made the surroundings unconnected with the Egyptian’s conscience, and this is what was required. It made the Egyptian see the issues of the region as something unrelated and affecting him such that he would lose sight of his interests well, so that Misr would lose its security surroundings with time and he would not be interested at all, and with time it seemed The ocean narrows and narrows until it is about to strangle the center of the circle, weakening Misr until it fragments. Misr abandoned Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Lebanon, and Sudan. The circle narrows for Misr over time, until the time of internal fragmentation. If the Egyptian is watching Britain and other countries interfering in the region, coming from overseas, how can Misr not have interests? A strong strategy in neighboring countries with the mentality of an Egyptian who does not see Misr as having interests in the region? There is a wrong idea spread among public opinion in Misr that Abdel Nasser caused Misr losses in a fake battle in the region without any interest other than trying to spread nationalist thought, including the Yemen war, which exhausted Misr greatly and was one of the reasons for the 1967 defeat. Misr lost a lot and gained nothing. This idea is wrong. It is agreed that Nasser made mistakes in the work, but Nasser was not wrong in the step and position, but rather the mistakes were in the calculation and implementation. As for saying that what Nasser did in the first place is wrong and not in the interest of Misr, It is a completely false statement. Nasser intervened in Yemen primarily for the benefit of Misr and not out of love for Yemen, for the sake of Misr, a strategic step to secure Misr. This is a fact that many in Misr do not understand. Now let us address this popular idea in Egyptian circles, but before that I would like to talk about an important point, which is the necessity of getting rid of the culture of favor and credit and absorbing the culture of common interests. There is a simple article that explains this part at this link, and I hope you see it for its importance http:/ /sun2son.blogspot.com/2016/12/blog-post_19.html?m=1Egypt entered Yemen for two reasons: 1- The first matter…to support a country so that it can be a strategic ally and on Misr’s side during any Saudi attempt to threaten its security. Misr, because Saudi Arabia is the one managing the America-Israel project in the region, has the upper hand for America and Israel in the region, meaning that Misr creates a strategic ally for it near the director of the Israel-America project, an ally that threatens Israel and America in any attempt to threaten Misr. The evidence is what you see today in Saudi Arabia’s movements in the region to serve Israel and America, and its attempts to subjugate Misr and besiege it in order to make Misr’s position on Saudi Arabia’s side at the expense of Misr’s national security interests. 2- The second order is to remove Britain from Yemen and end its control and control over Bab al-Mandab, the strategic maritime artery and the evidence. Immediately after the signing of the Nasser and Faisal agreement in Khartoum, the British evacuation agreement from South Yemen was signed and the National Front assumed power in South Yemen, which had a strong relationship. In Abdel Nasser. In 1962, Misr supported a revolution against the Imamate regime in Yemen. Abdel Nasser succeeded in Algeria because it was a national liberation battle against an external colonialist who united the internal front in Algeria, so both sides of the conflict were external and internal, but he failed in Yemen, especially North Yemen, for many reasons, including that in Yemen it turned into an internal civil war, even if it was with the support of… External, the two sides of the conflict were internal. It was not possible to resolve the matter in Yemen quickly because of the nature of Yemen, which was outside the experience of Misr’s political experience, as well as the changes that took place after the setback of 1967, which led to the signing of an agreement between Misr and Saudi Arabia in Khartoum. It is certain that The third reason is the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the lack of a successor to continue the project. Rather, he had an abortion. In 1967, Misr was waging a war against Israel, and at the same time Yemen was waging a battle against the two kings, supported by Saudi Arabia and America, to stabilize the republic. After the setback, Misr was forced to sign an agreement with Israel. Yes, Israel, and this is a fact that is difficult to understand. The Khartoum Agreement was between Misr and Israel. Faisal was merely an agent of Israel. Misr’s withdrawal from Yemen and the transformation of the conflict into an internal Yemeni political matter in Yemen, Britain’s withdrawal from the south and the signing of the evacuation agreement, so Nasser abandoned the final decision in the north, but he was victorious in the south. The Khartoum Agreement stipulated the withdrawal of the Egyptian army, Saudi Arabia’s recognition of the republican regime in Yemen, and hosting the two kings. Nasser accepted the agreement, but after Misr emerged from the setback of 1967 and Misr lost soldiers in Yemen, it decided to think about a political mechanism for the conflict through negotiations, and Abdel Nasser had in mind transforming the conflict in Yemen into political action on Yemeni soil, because he is aware that Saudi Arabia will not end its battle in Yemen. . The evidence is that as soon as the Egyptian army left, the epic of the seventies, the siege of Sana’a, took place. Misr’s situation did not allow for increased attrition. 1970 Nasser died and the Khamar Conference was formed in Yemen, the official representative of Saudi Arabia in Yemen, and reconciliation took place in Yemen allowing the return of the two kings affiliated with Saudi Arabia and their participation in governance. Thus, Yemen was divided between Saudi Arabia and Misr in influence, and another political bloc was formed that proceeded in the same way. Misr path. Political influence in Yemen began to extend across the entire map, and widespread polarization operations took place by the two blocs. But in the end, the Saudi Khamar Conference was victorious, specifically after the killing of Yemeni President Al-Hamdi, orchestrated by Saudi intelligence, due to a disastrous step that the North was about to take, which was signing a unity agreement with the South, which had left Saudi Arabia’s influence. 1978 The Camp Dawoud Accords were signed, the largest earthquake in the region, and Among the most important results of the agreement: the map of the region changed, Saddam’s coup against al-Bakr took place in Iraq, and the Iranian revolution took place. Where are Misr’s mistakes that occurred in Yemen during the era of Gamal Abdel Nasser? 1- The lack of previous political experience in Yemen led to Misr’s military involvement and exhaustion. 2- The setback of 1967, which weakened Misr, which contributed to the weakness of Misr’s position in Yemen. 3- The failure to continue the position in Yemen after the death of Abdel Nasser. Let us leave the above behind and head now to Misr. The important question is: Why did Misr reach this situation? The logical answer is: Egyptian policy mistakes are what brought Misr to this situation. what is the solution ? It is to correct those mistakes committed by Egyptian politics that led Misr to its current situation. how ? Now that we are in the year 2016, events are taking place in Yemen that are an exact copy of the events of 1962. The situation now in Yemen is the same as the situation in 1962, as if Yemen is trying to repeat the scenario of the 1962 movie and dedicate it to Misr, in order for Misr to correct its previous mistakes. With the differences in the balance of power in Yemen between yesterday and today, meaning that the position in Yemen now is the same as yesterday’s position, but with a difference in the nature and circumstances of Yemen today. Saudi Arabia wants to restore its previous influence in a new way by redividing Yemen into mini-states to get rid of Yemen’s power, and Britain has returned to the region and wants to obtain Aden and divide Yemen to place it under its influence and control Bab al-Mandab. There is leaked news about an Israeli desire for a base in Yemen, and Saudi Arabia has begun to raise the issue of a base in Djibouti, which is essentially for the benefit of Israel. What is the difference between yesterday and today in Yemen? In terms of forces, the tribal bloc that stood with Saudi Arabia yesterday is now standing against Saudi Arabia alongside the largest party, which is the Congress and the Ansar Allah group, and as for the progressive political parties from the Nasserist and Socialist parties, they are now standing with Saudi Arabia. In the past, the problem was the tribal belt around Sanaa and the rugged mountainous region in the north, but today the security belt is strong around Sanaa and most of the rugged mountainous areas outside Saudi influence and in the hands of the Yemeni army and the popular committees. In the past, the fight was between two republics and two kings, but today, from the point of view of those standing against Saudi Arabia, it is a war between independence and sovereign decision and between Saudi hegemony and influence and the division of Yemen… a battle to defend the homeland, and for Saudi Arabia it is a war between legitimacy and a coup. . In the past, Yemen had a traditional army, but today Yemen has a strong, trained and modern army, along with supportive popular committees. In other words, Misr’s entry into the Yemen file will be very easy, and it will not be like the previous time in 1962. Yesterday, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, America, Britain, and Iran were with the royalists in Yemen, while Misr and the Soviet Union were with the Republicans. Today, the alliance is almost the same as yesterday, with a change between Misr and Iran. Now let us think logically that a player moves the pieces on the chessboard and makes moves, then discovers that they are wrong moves that make his position in the game difficult and weak in front of the opponent. Question: What should be done to get out of this impasse? The answer: He must retract those wrong steps. But is the discount allowed? Suddenly the player finds himself watching the pieces retreat on their own to their previous positions, giving the player a rare opportunity to repeat the game, in order to change his moves and not repeat the previous mistakes he made. That player is Misr, the opponent is the Zionist project, and the gift is Yemen. The strength of Yemen is the strength of Misr, and the strength of Misr is the strength of Yemen. The loss of Yemen’s sovereignty is the loss of Misr’s sovereignty, and the disintegration of Yemen is the disintegration of Misr. It is in Misr’s strategic interest for Yemen to be without Saudi guardianship, to have no influence in Yemen, and to have full Yemeni sovereignty. . Misr must leave the Saudi alliance and stand and strongly support Yemen against the House of Saud. All the strings of the battle are in Yemen’s hands, and Saudi Arabia is immersed in the Yemeni quagmire, and the results of the battle will be in favor of Yemen. Misr must stand with Yemen to win a big card in any situation with Israel. You cannot gain a real ally in Yemen whose strong arm is against the Zionist project, knowing that the power equation in the war today is in favor of Yemen. Son of the sun…